Arizona's NECP Goal Two Results

Presented to the Public Safety Communications Advisory Commission

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Public Safety Interoperable Communications Office

Overview


- Background
- NECP Goal 2 Measurement
- Arizona Compendium of Findings and Recommendations
- Summary of NECP Goal Two Results
- Next Steps

National Emergency Communications Plan



- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) developed the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP).
- The NECP identifies key areas for improvements by the public safety community—including planning, governance, operating procedures, and training.
- In addition to these priority areas, the NECP established performance benchmarks to measure the ability of public safety agencies to demonstrate response-level emergency communications.

NECP Goals






- These benchmarks were reflected in the NECP's three goals:
 - Goal 1: By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated within the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.
 - **Goal 2:** By 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.
 - **Goal 3:** By 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within three hours of a significant event, as outlined in national planning scenarios.

Response Level Communications

• The NECP defines "response level communications" as:

The capacity of individuals with primary operational leadership responsibility to manage resources and make timely decisions during an incident.

NECP Goal 2 Measurement





- Capabilities data was collected from all Arizona counties as part of the annual Target Capabilities Assessment (TCA) update conducted by the Arizona Department of Homeland Security (AZDOHS) in 2010 and 2011.
- Goal One assessments were conducted by OEC for the Phoenix and Tucson UASIs in 2010.
- All Non-UASI jurisdictions were required to demonstrate Goal Two performance in 2011.

NECP Goal 2 Observations




- PSIC worked with Arizona's 13 non-UASI counties to assess their ability to demonstrate response-level emergency communications during a routine event.
- Events were to be managed in accordance with National Incident Management System (NIMS) and included large public gatherings that required participation from multiple public safety agencies and jurisdictions.
- Observed events included participation from 116 State and local public safety agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 12 Tribal agencies and six Federal agencies.
- Thirty-two individuals served on one or more observation teams.

National Submissions

- Arizona was one of 22 States that submitted complete NECP Goal Two performance and capability data responses by October 31, 2011.
- Goal Two data for other US counties is still being gathered by Federal DHS. The status of collected information as of January 31, 2012 is illustrated below.





Compendium of Findings and Recommendations

- Arizona Compendium of Findings and Recommendations from National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) Goal 2 Observations seeks to improve understanding of the current state of interoperable communications across Arizona.
- The Compendium documents the key findings from all of the NECP Goal 2 observations.
- Includes the best practices, lessons learned, and recommendations developed by the observation teams.
- Organized by the three primary observation categories used to evaluate Goal 2 Performance:
 - Common Policies and Procedures
 - Responder Roles and Responsibilities
 - Communications System Quality and Continuity



SUMMARY OF AZ NECP GOAL TWO RESULTS



COMMON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Shared policies and procedures should exist to allow interagency communications to occur in a consistent and structured manner during the event. The policies should be designed to avoid confusion, improve operational effectiveness, and increase the safety of responders and citizens.




Interagency communications policies and procedures were common or consistent amongst all responding agencies.

Element 1 Summary Results

1.1 Did policies and procedures exist for interagency communications between the involved jurisdictions, agencies, and disciplines?






Element 1 Summary Results cont.











Established interagency communications policies and procedures were followed throughout the event.

Element 2 Summary Results








Element 2 Summary Results cont.

2.2 Did established policies and procedures exist between responding agencies for request, activation, accountability, deactivation, and problem resolution of deployable interagency communications resources, such as mobile communications centers, gateways






Interagency communications policies and procedures across all responding agencies were consistent with NIMS.

Element 3 Summary Results



3.1 Were interagency communications policies and procedures across responding agencies consistent with NIMS?






A priority order for use of interagency communications resources was followed as established in standard operation procedures or plans, such as the Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP).

Element 4 Summary Results



4.1 & 4.2 Does a priority order exist for use of interagency communications resources (e.g., life safety before property protection)? Was this prioritization of communications resource use followed?






A primary interagency operations talk path was clearly established by procedure and communicated to responders early in the event.

Element 5 Summary Results



5.1 & 5.2 Was a primary interagency communications talk path clearly established by procedures used during the event? If not, was such a talk path established ad hoc and communicated to responders early in the event?






Common terminology and plain language were used in all interagency communications.

Element 6 Summary Results

6.1 Was plain language used throughout the event?






Element 6 Summary Results cont.

6.2 & 6.3 Did any communications problems arise amongst the primary operational leadership due to a lack of common terminology?

Did any communications problems arise amongst other response-level emergency personnel during the event due to a lack of common








Clear unit identification procedures were used.

Element 7 Summary Results

7.1 Were clear unit identification procedures used amongst the primary operational leadership?






Element 7 Summary Results










Common channel names were used for designated interoperability channels.

Element 8 Summary Results




8.1 Were common names used by all responding agencies for interagency communications channels?



Element 8 Summary Results cont.

8.2 Were standard names as identified in the National Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) used for Federal Communications Commission (FCC)-designated interoperability channels?







RESPONDER ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The responsibilities of responders should be clearly established and maintained during the event. Specifically, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) principles of chain and unity of command, unified command (for multi-agency incidents), and a managed span of control should be demonstrated.




Multiple organizations with inherent responsibility for some portion of the event were present and joined in a unified command with a single individual designated with Operations Section Chief responsibilities.

Element 9 Summary Results

9.1 Did a single individual carry out the Operations Section Chief responsibilities in each operational period?








Span of control was maintained amongst the primary operational leadership: the Operations Section Chief and first-level subordinates.

Element 10 Summary Results








Element 10 Summary Results



10.2 Did first-level subordinates to the Operations Section Chief directly manage more than seven subordinates at any time?






Communications Unit Leader (COML) roles and responsibilities were carried out by the Incident Commander (IC)/Unit Commander (UC) or designee.

Necessary communications resources were effectively ordered using documented procedures, and a communications plan was established by procedure or developed early in the event.

Element 11 Summary Results









11.2 Were COML roles and responsibilities carried out, either by the Incident Commander (or Unified Command), the COML, or another designee?






11.4 Were necessary communications resources effectively ordered?













11.6 Was a Communications
Plan established by procedure
or developed early in the
event?

11.7 Did the Communications
Plan meet the communications
needs of the primary
operational leadership?







COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM QUALITY AND CONTINUITY

Land mobile radio (LMR) and related public safety communications systems should provide high-quality communications throughout the event for command and control of responding personnel, including if and when primary systems experience failures or disruptions.




No more than one out of every 10 transmissions was repeated amongst the primary operational leadership due to failure of initial communications attempts.

Element 12 Summary Results

12.1 Were more than one out of every 10 transmissions repeated due to failure of initial communications attempts amongst the primary operational leadership?









Upon failure or overload of any primary communications mode, a backup was provided.

Element 13 Summary Results








13.2 & 13.3 Did the primary mode fail during the event at any time? If so, was a back-up effectively provided?








Primary operational leadership communicated adequately to manage resources and make timely decisions during the event or incident.

Element 14 Summary Results



14.1 Overall, was the primary operational leadership able to communicate adequately to manage resources during the incident or event?





NEXT STEPS

Next Steps

- Jurisdictions are encouraged to use their Goal 2 AARs and the Compendium recommendations for emergency communications planning within their county, and to improve communications during planned events and when responding to incidents.
- Participating agencies can use the Compendium to compare their demonstration results with statewide findings for each observational element.



Next Steps cont.

 Goal Two findings will help PSIC better target its policy, planning, and support services to address gaps and needs identified during the Goal 2 observations.



- Examples of activities include:
 - TICP development support
 - Targeting of Communications Unit Leader Training
 - Development & Distribution of template policies and SOPs
 - Development of Federal grant applications
 - Requests for technical assistance services
 - Support to Counties with their countywide improvement efforts.

Discussion



Questions/Discussion

Thank you!

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